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Abstract 
We consider the R&D investments competition of the two duopolistic firms in a 
weakly complementary technologies economy. By "the weakly complementary 
technologies", we mean that each firm can produce goods without both of the two 
technologies but it incurs more redundant costs than that in the case each or both of the 
technologies may be available for it. By "the strongly complementary technologies," 
we mean that the firm cannot produce the goods at all without the use of both of them. 
We derive the investments competition equilibria in R&D of the two weakly 
complementary technologies with and without the (cross-) licensing system. By 
comparing of the R&D investment levels in the two equilibria, we show that the (cross-) 
licensing system promotes the R&D investments when the duopolistic firms can 
produce goods by using of the two weakly complementary technologies. 
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1. Introduction 
Technological innovations are supported by the technological inventions, which 
have the following two features. First, technological inventions have the characteristic 
of public goods. Since they are a kind of information, the discoverer of such an 
invention cannot exclude other persons from using it. Also many people can use it 
simultaneously. These features of technological inventions induce non-discoverers' 
(non-inventors') imitation of them, and discourage researchers or inventors from 
creating them. Secondly, technological inventions are associated with other 
technologies. When the discoverers or inventors of plural distinct technological 
inventions differ, how does the coordination make among the discoverers affect the 
interest of each discoverer or inventor, and also affect their R&D incentives of them. 
Over the past decade of the last century, a number of studies have been discussed 
on the effects of the relations among technological inventions upon the R&D activities, 
the licensing or the patent systems. 
The technological inventions of the type of cumulative relations in which one 
(some) of them is (are) developed or worked out on the basis of other preceding one(s). 
Under such cumulative technological innovations, Green and Scotcher(1995), 
Chang(1995) show(s) that the externality due to the lack of the coordination among the 
discoverers of plural distinct technological inventions decreases their incentives to 
create or develop them. 
Another feature of the relations among the technological inventions is the 
complementary relation among them. As we typically have seen in the IT 
(Information Technologies) industries, technological innovations occur on the basis of 
plural distinct technological inventions invented (developed) in different systems of 
1 
technologies. In this environment, distinct technologies are technologically 
complementary for the product produced by making use of them. Of course, in such a 
complementary technological innovation, the externality problem due to the lack of the 
coordination among the discoverers of plural complementary technologies does occur. 
Heller and Eisenberg(1998) point out that the existence of such externality brings the 
result known as "the tragedy of anti-commons:" When the property rights of plural 
distinct technologies are authorized to different agents (fIrms), the externality brings 
excessive exercises of the exclusive rights, and under-utilization of these technologies, 
and discourages incentives for R&D activities ofagents(fIrms). 
In the case where a product is produced by utilizing such complementary 
inventions, a (cross-) licensing for them has strategic importance. If two different 
fIrms have one of the two distinct technological inventions with a strongly (perfect) 
complementarity, then they cannot produce a product at all without a (cross-) licensing 
for them. In practice, as the positive analyses in the appliance and Ie industries 
conducted by Grindley and Teece(1997) and Hall and Ziedonis(2001) show us, the 
conditions of the fIrms' (cross-) licensing for the product have a great effect on their 
incentives for R&D activities in such industries where strongly complementary 
technological inventions are indispensable for producing the product l . In economic 
literatures, however, there have been made few theoretical studies on how the 
conditions of the fIrms' (cross-) licensing for the product affect fIrms' incentives for 
R&D activities. Fershtman and Kamien(1992) does not analyze how the difference 
between a cross-licensing and unilateral licensing affect fIrms' incentives for R&D 
1 A great number of distinct technological inventions with a strongly (perfect) complementarity, for example, IC 
technologies, software technologies, LCD(Liquid Crystal Display) technologies and so on, are indispensable for a 
appliance producer producing and selling a cellular phone. 
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activities at all, since they focus on a dynamic prospect of technological innovation in 
their seminar study in such a context. 
Therefore, in this paper, we make a theoretical analysis on how the difference 
between a cross-licensing and a unilateral licensing affects firms' incentives for R&D 
activities in a Cournot duoply. When firms invest in R&D of two distinct technologies 
with strong complementarity, both technologies are indispensable for producing 
products, so note that the only licensing that may occur is a cross-licensing. Therefore, 
in our analysis, we focus on the case where each duopolistic firm can invest on R&D for 
the two distinct technological inventions with weak complementarity with each other. 
But we conduct our analysis by a static model with respect to each firm's R&D 
investment since we does not treat dynamic aspects of technological innovations. 
In section 2, we describe our model, and analyze the problem of R&D in 
Cournot duopoly with weakly complementary technological innovations without 
licensing as a benchmark in section 3. In section 4, we examine the conditions under 
which (cross-) licensings occur. However we explore which (cross-) licensing may 
occur at every state of nature in the Appendix. Extending our analysis to the case with 
a (cross-) licensing, we make a theoretical analysis on how the difference between a 
cross-licensing and unilateral licensing affects firms' incentives for R&D activities in a 
Cournot duoply in section 5. In the final section, we present our concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
Let us consider a duopolistic market in which a homogeneous product is 
produced and sold by two firms: Firm x and Firm y. At the first stage, each firm 
invests in R&D for the two distinct but weakly complementary technologies, A and B 
3 
simultaneously. By "the weakly complementary technologies", we mean that each ftrm 
can produce the goods without both of the two technologies but it incurs more redundant 
costs than that in the case with each or both of the technologies 2 • Denote by 
X A' X B (~O) and y A' Y B (~ 0) , the investment levels for the technologies A, B of ftrm x 
and the investment levels for the technologies A, B of ftrm y, respectively. If it 
succeeds in the development of at least one of these technologies, a process innovation 
brings the reduction of its marginal cost of production. Assume that each ftrm has 
constant returns to scale production technology, so it has a linear cost function, 
i =X,y, (1) 
where c A' C B are marginal costs correspondence to the technology A and B 
respectively and c A = C A + c = C B = C B + c . That is, C t, k = A, B is the marginal cost 
of production without succeeding in the development of the technology k, and c(>O) is 
the cost reduction level due to the development of the technology. 
That is, we can look upon c(>O) as the measure of the degree of technological 
innovation. Without loss of generality, we can assume that c A = C B = 0 . Under this 
setting, if each ftrm succeeds in the deVelopment of the technology A, it can reduce its 
marginal cost of production from 2c to c. If it succeeds in the development of both 
technologies, the ftrm can reduce its marginal cost of production from 2c to O. At 
the end of the ftrst stage, "nature" chooses whether each ftrm succeeds in the 
development of the technologies or not Suppose that each ftrm succeeds in the 
development of the technology j with probability 
2 That is, we distinguish "the weakly complementary technologies" from "the strongly complementary technologies", 
in that the frrm cannot produce the goods at all without the use of both of them. For the similar analysis of in the case 
of the strongly complementary technologies, see Okamura, Shinkai and Tanaka (2002). 
4 
function is well defined since we have, 
, " , 3 
p" (·»O,p" (·)<O,Pk (0)-+'00 and Pk(O)=O,p,,(oo)=l,k=A,B . We also 
assume that Pk (.) are identically and independently distributed. 
The inverse market demand function of the product is given by 
p=a-Q (2) 
where p is the market price and Q is the aggregate output of production in the market, 
that is Q = qr + q y • We assume that .!. a > c , and this assumption guarantees that even 
4 
the firm with the highest cost can produce the positive quantity of output. At the 
beginning of the second stage, each firm knows all successes or failures of the both 
firms' developments of the technologies. At the second stage, if a (cross-) licensing 
system is available, then each firm bargains to its rival and agrees a (cross-) licensing 
contract, and they divide the total profit due to the licensing according to the Nash 
bargaining solution. If the (cross-) licensing system is not available, then the game 
proceeds to the third stage. At the third stage, each firm's cost of production realized 
and each firm chooses its quantity of output simultaneously, that is, Cournot 
competition occurs. Finally, the fmal profit of each firm is realized and the game is over. 
The timing of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Before our main analysis, we conduct some preliminary works. Denote 
3 In this paper, we assume the effect of the R&D activity on a process innovation as a static one. These properties of 
the success probability function are similar ones for the dynamic "memoryless" or "Poisson" patent race model 
associated with Reiganum( 1982). In his model, the research technology is characterized by the assumption that a 
finn's probability of making a discovery and obtaining a patent at a point of time depends only on this finn's current 
R&D investment level and not on its past R&D experience. For Introductory illustration to the dynamic patent race 
5 
(3) 
Since Firm i chooses its output so as to maximize (3) in Coumot equilibrium, we easily 
see that the equilibrium output of Firm i can be obtained as a function of c1 and C j' 
(4) 
Substituting (4) into (3) yields Firm i 's Coumot equilibrium profit, 
(The first stage) 
R&D competition 
Decision on R&D 
investment level 
of the fIrmS x, y 
(The Second Stage) 
Bargaining for licensing 
Choice of the license fee 
Nature's choise on 
Success or failure 
of the development 
(5) 
(The third stage) 
Decision on quantity 
of outputs 
cbumot competition 
Figure 1. Timing of the game 
In the next section, we analyze the problem of R&D in a Coumot duopoly with 
weakly complementary technological innovation without licensing as a benchmark. 
3. R&D investment without (cross-) licensings-------A benchmark-----
In our model, all possible states of nature are 16 ways. Denote by {X,y}, the a 
model, see section 10.2 of Chap. 10 in Tirole(1989). 
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state of nature in that the state of nature Firm x faces and the one Firm y does are X and 
Y, respectively: Where X,Y E {AB,A,B,9} and "AB", "A", "B" and "9" implies that 
each firm successes in development of technologies A and B, A,B and nothing, 
respectively. Hence, all possible states of nature that we have are give by {AB, AB}, 
{AB, A}, {AB, B}, {AB, 9}, {A, AB}, {A, A}, {A, B}, {A, 9}, {B, AB}, {B, A}, {B, B}, 
{B, 9}, {9, AB}, {9, A}, {9, B} and {9, 9}. From the model setting in the 
proceeding section, the corresponding realized Cournot duopoly equilibrium profit of 
Firm x are 1l".,(O,O),1l".,(O,e),1l".,(O,e),1l".,(O,2e) 1l"., (e,O),1l"., (e,e) 
,1l"., (e, c), 1l" ., (e,2e) , 1l"x(e,O),1l" .,(e, e),1l"., (e,e), 1l"., (e,2e), 1l" rC2e,O),1l"., (2e, e),1l"., (2e,e) 
and 1l"., (2e,2e). We also have the corresponding realized Cournot duopoly 
and 1l" y (2e,2e) . Then, the expected profit of Firm x without (cross-) licensing is given 
by, 
(6) 






The first order condition is given by 3 
arrxCXA,XB'YA'YB) = 
8xA 
From (7b) and (7 c), we see that H2 = H3, so by (8) we can obtain 
(7d) 
(9) 
Noticing the symmetry of Firm x and Y in a Coumot duopoly, we focus on the 
symmetric equilibrium hereafter throughout this paper. Then, we can denote the 
probability of the failure for the development of each technology, by 
s = e-XA = e-XB = e-YA = e-YB • Rewriting the equations (7a),(7b),(7c) and (7d), we 
obtain 
3 The second order condition at the equilibrium we derive is that 1-[_s_ -~(H 2 - H 4)]2 > 0 holds. If 
I-s I-s 
o < s ~ 1/2 holds, then we can easily show that this inequality holds. 
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Therefore the first order condition (9) is expressed by 
;(s) = aIIx(xA,xB'YA'YB) sV(s) - 1 
aXA 
=skl-s)(HI -H2)+s(H2 -H4 )}-I=O, 
From (lOa), (lOb) and (lOc), we see that 
H2 - H4 = (l-s)2 [ !fi( c, O)-!fi( 2c, 0)] +2s(l-s) [ !fi( c, C)-!fi( 2c, c)] 
By noticing the above fact, HI - H 2 and H 2 - H 4 can be rewritten into 














n4 = 1li c, 0)- R';( 2c, 0) = gc(a-3c) (ISd) 
4 




n6 =R';(c,2c)-R';(2c,2c)= -c(a-c). 
9 
(1St) 
From the above equations, we can easily notice that nJ = n6 , nJ + n3 = 2n2 and 
n4 + n6 = 2ns . Therefore, V( s) in the first order condition (11) can be simplified to 
Furthermore, by equation (12), noticing the fact that ns - n4 = n2 - nJ , 
2(n2 - nJ) - (nJ - n4 ) = 0, we can finally see that 
V(s) = nJ • 
So the first order condition (11) yields 
,(s) = nJs -1 = O. (17) 
If ,0) = nl -1 = R'; (0,0) - R'; (c,O) > 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium solution 
s· = ~(O < s· ~ 1) that solves the equation (17). Since s· = e-x• , the R&D 
nl 
investment expenditure at the symmetric equilibrium is obtained: 
• 4 
x = In-c(a-c) = In [n;( 0, O)-n/( c, 0)]. 
9 
That is we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 
(18) 
Suppose that a ~ 3.J2 and .!. a > c . 
4 
a-.Ja2 -9 1 
If < c < -a, then there exists a 
2 4 
unique positive symmetric equilibrium R&D investment expenditure x· in our model 
10 
without (cross-) licensing, 
H ax· > 0 ence, Ba ' 
ax· 
-> O. Bc 
Proof: From the preceding 
• 4 
x = In-c(a-c). 
9 
argument of the proposition, if 
;(l)=nl-l=1l';(O,O)-Il';(c,O)-l>O, then x· hence s· =e-x' is a unique solution of 
the first order condition (18). Solving the quadratic inequality with respect to 
c,9(1) = nl -1 = 1l';(O,O)-1l';(c,O)-1 = !c(a- c)-I> 0, we obtain 9 
a-.Ja2 -9 a+.Ja2 -9 
----<c< and a~3. (19) 
2 2 
Furthermore, since s· = e -x' has to satisfy the second order condition gIven In 
• 1 / footnote 3, s = - ~ 1 2 . The last inequality is equivalent to the inequality 
nl 
- 2c2 + 2ac - 9 ~ 0 . Solving this quadratic inequality with respect to c, we obtain 
a-.Ja2 -18 a+.Ja2 -18 ~ -----~c~ and a~3v2. 2 2 (20) 
a-.Ja2 -9 1 We can show that any c E {c < c < -a } satisfies both (19) and (20). 
2 4 
ax· ax· a-.Ja2 -9 1 We can easily show that- > 0 and - > 0 if < c < -a . & & 2 4 
Q.E.D. 
One of the above conditions is the one that guarantees the firm with the highest 
cost to produce the product,1l';(2c,0) > 0 <=>!a > c. In words, this condition expresses 
4 
the feature of weakly complementary technological inventions. Another condition, 
11 
~(l) = n1 -1 = n';(O,O) - "i(C,O) -1 ~ 4 c(a - c) -1> 0 implies that the increment of 9 
benefit of a firm with one technology due to becoming available for another technology 
by unilateral licensing from its rival with two technologies exceeds its marginal cost of 
R&D investment. 
4. The Conditions under which (cross-) licensings may occur 
There are 16 states of nature since in our model the firms faces to develop the two 
weakly complementary technologies as we have seen in the preceding section. That is, 
{AB, AB}, {AB, A}, {AB, B}, {AB,~}, {A, AB}, {A, A}, {A, B}, {A, ~}, {B, AB}, {B, 
A}, {B,B}, {B, ~}, {~,AB}, {~,A}, {~,B} and {~,~}. Notice that there are 12 
cases where a (cross-) licensing may occurs, except for {AB, AB}, {A, A}, {B, B} and 
{ ~ , ~ }. In our model, firms and their R&D investments at the equilibrium are 
symmetry. Therefore we can classify these 12 states of nature into the next four 
categories. 
I . The cases in which each firm succeeds in the development of one of the different 
technologies: {A, B} and {B, A}. In the case included in this category, a 
cross-licensing may occur. 
IT. The cases in which anyone of the firms succeeds in the development of only one of 
the two technologies, and the other firm fails the developments of both of the two: 
{A, ~}, {B, ~}, {~,A} and {~,B}. 
ill. The cases in which one of the firms succeeds in the development of one of the two 
technologies, and the other firm does both of the two: {AB, A}, {AB, B}, {A, AB} 
and {B,AB}. 
IV. The cases in which anyone of the firms succeeds in the development of the two 
12 
technologies, and the other firm fails the developments of both: {AB, (J} and {(J, 
AB}. 
In the following, we present the conditions under which a (cross-) licensing 
occurs and the correspondent licensing fee in the cases included in each of the above 
four categories. For the concrete derivation of the licensing conditions and the 
licensing fees in the case contained the four categories, see Appendix. 
T . In the cases included in this category, the cross-licensing fee is given by 
Fr=O· 
We have the cross-licensing conditions under which the cross-licensing occurs: 
2a>c 
II . In the cases included in this category, the unilateral licensing fee is given by 
1 c(2a-3c) Fn=-[1l'/(c,2c)-1l'/2c,c)]= >0. 2 6 




m. In the cases included in this category, the unilateral licensing fee is given by 
c(2a-c) >0. 
6 










N. In the cases included in this category, there are two type of cases in which the 
unilateral licensing occurs. In one type of the cases, the unilateral licensing of only 
one technology occurs. In the other type of the cases, the unilateral licensing of both 
of the two technologies occurs. As we show in the Appendix, the unilateral 
licensing strategy of both of the two technologies dominates that of only one 
13 
technology for the licenser firm. At last, the unilateral licensing fee in the cases 
included in this category is given by 
that is the fee of the unilateral licensing of both of the two technologies. 






From the assumption presented in section 2 that guarantees even the Cournot firm with 




So we see that all the four licensing fees are strictly positive by (29). From the above 
argument, as can see in Figure 2 below, under the assumption (29), the conditions we 






.... 4, .... IVI "- I c 
2 1 ~f1 2 2 2a -a -a -a -a 15 5 7 5 
C E (29) 
I. The cases in which each firm succeeds in the development of one of the different technologies: 
n. The cases in which anyone ofthe firms succeeds in the development of only one of the two 
technologies, and the other firm fails the developments of both of the two: 
m. The cases in which one of the firms succeeds in the development of one of the two technologies, and 
14 
the other finn does both of the two: 
IV. The cases in which anyone of the frrms succeeds in the development of the two technologies, and the 
other finn fails the developments of both: N 2• In this category, a unilateral licensing of the two technologies 
occur. N 2. In this category, a unilateral licensing of only one technology occurs. 
Figure 2 The conditions under that (cross-) licensing occur 
The first one is the case, !. 0 ~ c ~ !. 0 , within this area, (cross-) licensings included in 
5 4 
the three categories T , IT and TIT stated above. The second one is ~o ~c~!.o, within 
15 5 
this area, a (cross-) licensing occurs in the case included in the four categories I ,II, 
m and N z. The third one is c~ ~o, within this area N 1, the case in which the 15 
unilateral licensing of only one technology that may occur. As a result, any (cross-) 
licensing occurs in the case included in the five categories I, II , m, N z and N 1. 
However, as we discuss earlier, the unilateral licensing strategy of both of the two 
technologies dominates that of only one technology for the licenser firm. At last, all 
the conditions with (cross-) licensings we have to examine are the two cases, 
1 1 1 
-0 ~c~ -0 and c~ -0. 
5 4 5 
5. R&D investment with (cross-) licensings 
In our model, as we find in the preceding section, which form of licensing occurs 
in a cross-licensing and a unilateral licensing, depends on the relation between the 
potential size of demand 0 and the measure of the degree of technological innovation c. 
One side, a cross-licensing is a kind of trade of exchange of its own technology with the 
other's one. The other side, a single licensing is the unilateral offer of the firm which 
succeeds in the development of the technology to the firms which fails to develop the 
technology. Since these two types of trades differ from each other, we distinguish 
15 
these two types of trades from each other. We pay attention to the area, c ~ .!:.. a In 
5 
which both a cross-licensing and a unilatera11icensing occur in this section. When a 
unilatera1licensing occurs, there exists a difference in technical superiority between the 
two fIrms due to the outcome of their developments. In our model, however, the state 
of nature which realizes in consequence of the two fIrm's R&D can be expressed by a 
pair of the number of the technologies of each fIrm that it succeeds in the development, 
since the measure of the degree of the technical innovation, "c" is same for the two 
fIrms and they are also symmetric. Denote such state of nature by (m;,mj ), where 
m; and m j are the number of the technologies of Firm i that it succeeds in the 
development, and the one of Firm j that succeeds in the R&D, respectively. Then, 
when we pay attention to the case where only a unilateral licensing occurs, the states we 
have to examine are ( 2, 1 ),( 2, 0 ),( 1, 0 ),( 1, 2 ),( 0, 2 ) and ( 0, 1). In preparation 
for the following derivation of the equilibrium, we write down the part of fIrm i's 
expected profIt in these states below. 
(4) The part offrrm i 's expected profIt in (2, 1) 
Since the threat point of fIrm j in this state is tr j (c,O), the unilateral licensing 
results in the ex-post profIt of fIrm i, tr;(O,O) + Fm, where Fm is given by (25). 
Hence the part of fIrm i 's expected profit in the state (2, 1), il2! can be give by 
(5) The part of fIrm i 's expected profIt in (2,0) 
Since the threat point of fIrm i in this state is tr; (0,2c), the unilateral licensing 
16 
results in the ex-post profit of firm i, tr; (0,0) + Fw, where Fw is given by (27) 
Hence the part of firm i 's expected profit in the state (2, 0), il20 can be give by 
il2o=(I-e-XAXI-e-XB){e-YA +e-YB -2e-YAe-YB}[tr/(0,0)+Fw]' (31) 
(6) The part offrrm i 's expected profit in (1,0) 
Since the threat point of firm i in this state is tr/(e,2e) , the unilateral licensing 
results in the ex-post profit of firm i ,tr;(e,c) + Fn, where Fn is given by (23). 
Hence the part of firm i's expected profit in the state (1, 0), illO can be give by 
illO=[e-XA + e-XB - 2e-XA e-XB ]e-YAe-YB [tr;(e,e) + Fn]. (32) 
(7) The part of firm i 's expected profit in (1,2) 
Since the threat point offrrm i in this state istr; (2c, c) , the unilateral licensing 
results in the ex-post profit of firm i ,tr;(O,O)-Fm, where Fm is given by (25). 
Hence the part of firm i's expected profit in the state (1, 2), ill2 can be give by 
ilI2=[e-XA +e-XB _2e-XA e-XB ] (l-e-YAXI-e-Y') [tr;(O,O)-Fm]. (33) 
(8) The part of firm i's expected profit in (0, 2) 
Since the threat point of firm i in this state istr;(2e,0), the unilateral licensing 
results in the ex-post profit of firm i, tr; (0,0) - Fw, where Fw is given by (27). 
Hence the part of firm i's expected profit in the state (0, 2), il02 can be give by 
il02=e-XAe-XB (l-e-YA)(l-e-YB ) [tr/(e,e)-Fwl· 
(9) The part of firm i 's expected profit in (0, 1) 
Since the threat point offrrm i in this state is tr; (2e, c) , the unilateral licensing 
results in the ex-post profit of firm i ,tr;(e,c) -Fn' where Fn is given by (23). 




Denoting by TI;, Finn i's expected profit with any licensing, it can be expressed 
by the sum of Finn i's expected profit without licensing, n; presented in the 
preceding section, the increment part of Finn i's expected profit with only a 
cross-licensing n7R and the increment part of Finn i's expected profit with a 
unilateral licensing. That is, we have 
The increment part of Finn i 's expected profit with only a cross-licensing n7R is 
given by, 
where h = 1l"; (0,0) -1l";(c,c). 
Therefore, in the case with any licensings, one of the first order conditions is the partial 
derivative of TI; with respect to XA. is equal to 0. Taking consideration the symmetry 
of the two finns and using that s = e-XA = e-XB = e-YA = e-YB , we can write the first 
order condition as follows: 
an anCR 
= -+--+ s(1-s)[AFm +BFrv l+s(2s-I)[BFn - CFml 
axA. aXA. 
(39) 
Now, in (38), we let 
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N(s)=s{(1-s)[AFm + BFw]+(2s-1)[BFn -CFm]+s[CFw +sFn]}=svr(s) (40) 
where, vr(s)=(1-s)[AFm +BFwl+(2s-1)[BFn -CFml+s[CFw +sFnl 
={(I-s)A -(2A -1)C}Fm + {(1-s)B -sC}Fw + {(2s -1)B +sA}Fn . 
From (37), we see that A=2s (l-s), B =S2, C =(1-s)2holds. So the coefficients 
Therefore, we have 
(1-s)A -(2A -1)C = (1-S)2 
(1-s)B-sC = s(l-s) 





where the last equality holds since Fm - Fw + Fn = O. Substituting (42) into (40), 
we have 
N(s) = s 'vr(s) = {(Fw - 2Fm)s + Fm}s. (43) 
Derive the partial derivative of (38) w.r.t. x A and using the symmetry offirms, 
an
CR 




where h =ll';(O,O)-J'l";(c,c)>O. Let g(s)=-. Then form (11),(39),(40), (43) and OxA 
(44), the first condition is reduced to 
aft an anCR g(s) =-= -+--+ N(s)=~(s)+s2(2s-1)(1-s)h+N(s) (45) OxA OxA OxA 
So we see that 
g(O) = ~(O) = -1 <0 
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1 1 (1) 1 1 g(-) =;(-)-1+ N - = ;(-)-I+-F. 
and 22 2 2 4 lV 
4c(a-c)-9 c(a-c) llc(a-c)-9 
= + = >0 9 6 18 
(46) 
h h d . 1· h Ids ·f 0-.Ja
2 
-9 1 d hi· 1· w ere t e secon mequa lty 0 1 < c < -0, an t e ast mequa lty 
2 4 
holds since c(2a - 3c) > 0 holds from (29). 
6 
From (45) and that tjJ(s) = n)s -1, we have 
g'(s) = ;'(s) + s(-8s 2 + 9s- 2)h+ N'(s) 
From (43), we see that N'(s) = 'I'(s) + (FlV - 2Fm)s 
Here put B(s)=s(-8s2 +9s-2)h. Then, we have, 
g(s)= tjJ(s) + B(s) + N(s) and 
g'(s) = ;'(s) + B'(s) + N'(s) 
= n) + B'(s) + N'(s) (47) 
g'(O) = n) + Fm > tjJ'(O) = n) > 0 '(1) - 2r:' _3r:' -h - c(10a-2lc) 0 ,g - n) + rlV rm - > 
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(48). Since we get 
B'() N'() (8 2 9 2)h 2c( 0 - (1 + s)c) (8 2 9 2) c(2o - c) 2c( 0 - (1 + s)c) s + s =s - s + s- + =s - S + s- +---..,;:.....-~~~ 
3 9 3 
B'(O) + N'(O) 2c(a - c) > o. 
3 
(49) 
B"(s)+N"(s)= 8c(2a-c) S2 +2c(2a-c)s- 4c(a+c). 
3 9 
(50) 
Therefore we can conclude that if 
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2 2 2 32c2(2a-c)(a+c) 
3c(2a-c)+3 c ( a-c) + 27 3c(2a-c)(1+~59/27) 
O<s< < <1 
8c(2a-c) 8c(2a-c) 
,then BW(s) + NW(s) > 0 from (50). 
However, we can easily show that 
( 2(2)2 32c
2(2a-c)(a+c) 1 3c 2a-c)+3 c a-c +-~-~..:..-~ 
_< ____ ~ _______ ~27~ ___ 
2 8c(2a-c) 




then B"(s) + NW(s) > 0 and g'(s") = 
~'(s)+B'(s)+N'(s»~'(s)=nJ >0 . Therefore, since B"(s") + N"(s·) >0 , 
taking into account the fact (47), (48), we conclude that 
g'(s·)= ~'(s·)+B'(s·)+N'(s·»~'(s·)=nJ (51) 
The fact that (48) and (51) holds simultaneously implies that g(s) has to intersect 
the horizontal axis at the left side of the point s·. Furthermore, from (46), if 
a-.Ja2 -9 1 
----< c < -a, then 
2 4 
g(~)={~)+1~) >~(~) > 0;: 1~) =±Fw > O. Note that 
s( ~) + ~(~) = 0 + ~( ~) = {~ ). The argument above is illustrated in Figure 4 















Figure 4. The equilibrium in the case with licensing s < s· « 112) 
Proposition 2 
If Proposition 1 holds, and hence there exists the equliribrium probability of 
failure s· = J..(O < s· :::;; 1/2) in the model without licensing. Then, there exists 
n1 
s( < s· :::;; 1/2) the equliribrium probability of failure in the model with unilateral 
licensing. Therefore, the equilibrium R&D expenditure in the model of licensing is 
greater than that in the model without licensing: x = -In s > -In s· = x· . 
This proposition shows that a (cross-) licensing system promotes R&D 
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investment when the duopolistic firms can produce goods by using the two weakly 
complementary technologies. 
In Okamura, Shinkai and Tanaka(2002), the existence of a cross-licensing system 
discourages firm's R&D investments, when the duopolistic firms can produce goods by 
using the two strongly complementary technologies, where any unilateral licensing 
cannot occur since firms needs both of the two technologies for their production of a 
product. The existence of a cross-licensing system decreases firms' incentives for 
R&D through the chance of the exchanges of their technologies. A unilateral licensing, 
however, encourages firms' incentives for R&D through the chance of their receiving 
(paying) of the licensing fee. When complementary technological innovation 
occurs, the effect of a cross-licensing system on firms' incentives for R&D works in the 
opposite direction to that of a unilateral licensing system does. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we explored the incentives for R&D investments of the 
duopolistic firms facing technological innovations in weakly complementary 
technologies by analyzing a simple static innovation model. The first result we obtain 
is that effect of a cross licensing as the exchange trade of technologies upon the 
incentives for R&D differs from the effect of the licensing as a unilateral trade upon 
them. The effects due to the difference between a cross licensing and a unilateral 
licensing systems upon the incentives for R&D changes the relations among 
technologies such as substitutability or complementarity. Therefore, the above 
discussion suggests us the importance of noticing the relations among technologies, to 
analyze how firms determine the incentives for R&D under complex technological 
23 
innovations. 
There remain many problems for future researches. First, in this paper, we focus 
on the symmetric equilibrium in order to make our analysis easy. In practice, however, 
firms cannot be symmetric in the industries where the complementary technologies are 
indispensable for the production of goods. In addition, the role of R&D ventures who 
do not produce products but concentrate on R&D, increases its importance in such 
industries. Secondly, in this paper, since we concentrate on the effect on the incentives 
for R&D, we did not examine the effects on the social welfare at the equilibrium. If 
we clarify how governments should plan and exercise the policy for technologies under 
complementary technological innovations, it is important for us to explore the 
implications on the economic welfare at the equilibrium in our model. 
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